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WRONGFUL DEATH OF A FETUS: DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION
ARISE WHEN THERE IS NO LIVE BIRTH?
I. INTRODUCTION
A controversy currently exists over the protections that should be
afforded an unborn child.1 The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade
2
1. For cases ruling on the issue of whether a fetus is a "person" for pur-
poses of a wrongful death action, see infra notes 6 & 7.
While this Note is limited to consideration of death actions involving fe-
tuses, many controversial issues evolve around the unborn or the "yet to be
born" child. For example, preconception torts are becoming more common.
See 2 S. SPEISER, THE AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS 1152 (1985). For a discussion of
the history and the elements of the tort of "wrongful life," see Azzolino v.
Dingfelder: Wrongful Life-The Ultimate Tort, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 921. See also 2 S.
SPEISER, supra, at 1185. For a discussion of the case law in the wrongful life
context, see Tort Law, 72 A.B.A. J. 46 (1986). For a general overview of the
rights of the unborn in various fields of the law, see Doudera, Fetal Rights? It
Depends, TRIAL, April 1982, at 38, 39 (discussing constitutional implications of
Roe v. Wade and evolution of fetal rights in property law, criminal law, and tort
law).
The debate over whether recovery for the death of a fetus should be allowed
evolves around the construction of the state's wrongful death statute because no
recovery is allowed at common law for the death of anyone, either born or un-
born. See IJ. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAw 347-48 (1982). For a further discus-
sion of the common law bar to a wrongful death action, see infra notes 8-14 and
accompanying text.
Death actions, both in the form of derivative actions and direct actions for
one's own damages caused by the death of another, were prohibited in the case
of Baker v. Bolton. See Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAWQ. REV. 431, 432 (1916). In Baker v. Bolton, the plaintiff's wife was killed when
the stagecoach atop which she was riding flipped over. Baker v. Bolton, 170
Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). The husband sued for loss of society and mental
distress stemming from her death, but the court dismissed the cause of action.
Id. While no explicit reason was given in Bolton to support the holding, the deci-
sion quite possibly stems from a case decided in 1607, Higgins v. Butcher. Holds-
worth, supra, at 432-33. The Higgins court held that a master could not sue the
killer of his servant because any private action the master might have had for lost
services is usurped by the Crown's prosecution for the underlying felony. Id.
The passage of the Fatal Accidents Act helped to remedy this common law
deficiency to a large extent. See Smedley, Some Order Out of Chaos in Wrongfid
Death Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (1984). For the text of the Fatal Acci-
dents Act, see infra note 8. However, while each of the states has adopted some
type of wrongful death remedy, the development of wrongful death legislation
has been bewildering and uncoordinated. Smedley, supra, at 276. Some juris-
dictions have adopted survival type statutes, others have passed acts patterned
after the Fatal Accidents Act, and some states have both. Id. For a discussion of
the distinction between "survival type" statutes and "wrongful death" or Lord
Campbell type legislation, see infra note 8. The end result of the haphazard
development of wrongful death legislation in this county is that the common law
rule still exists and, therefore, controls when an action is not authorized by a
state's wrongful death statute. Smedley, supra, at 276. For a discussion of the
applicability of the common law rule in this country, see infra note 11.
(669)
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that, for purposes of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution, a fetus is not a person.3 State courts, however, have deter-
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held that a Texas law, which
prohibited abortions before a fetus is viable except for the purpose of saving the
mother's life, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 164. For a discussion of the implications of the Roe decision upon the
rights of a fetus, see infra note 3.
Roe adopted a trimester viability approach which appears to be firmly en-
trenched. See, e.g., Ford, The Evolution of a Constitutional Right to an Abortion, Fash-
ioned in the 1970s and Secured in the 1980s, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 307-21 (1983);
Special Project, Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 128; Comment, The
Viability of the Trimester Approach, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 322, 341-45 (1984).
For a general discussion in support of the Roe decision as well as its prog-
eny, see Ford, supra, at 271-322; Comment, supra, at 322-45. But see Walker &
Puzder, State Protection of the Unborn after Roe v. Wade: A Legislative Proposal, 13
STET. L. REV. 237 (1984) (proposing abrogation of Roe through congressional
enactment declaring "person" as used in fourteenth amendment to include fe-
tuses from conception). Cf Ford, supra, at 279 (Rhode Island law that declared
"person" to mean fetus from moment of conception held unconstitutional).
3. 410 U.S. at 158. The Roe Court did hold, however, that once a fetus
reaches the stage of viability, the state could regulate or even proscribe abor-
tions in the interest of protecting the "potentiality of human life." Id. at 162-64.
The majority opinion in Roe bypassed the issue of recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus:
[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to
endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth
or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situa-
tions and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For
example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal
injuries even though the child was born alive. That rule has been
changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to
be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the
injuries were sustained, though few courts have squarely so held. In a
recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, some
States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for
wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however,
would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus
consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the po-
tentiality of life.
Id. at 161-62 (citations omitted).
The decision in Roe, however, does not necessarily preclude recovery for
the wrongful death of a fetus, at least a viable fetus, because the Court noted
that allowing such a recovery could be consistent with the state's interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of life that exists during the third trimester. Id. at 161-
64.
In addition, the decision in Roe only defined the term person for purposes
of the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, the Roe decision does not compel
state courts to deny recovery for prenatal wrongful death. See Kader, The Law of
Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639, 656 (1980). Roe has
even been cited as authority to allow wrongful death recovery, based on the dicta
that the state has a substantial interest in protecting prenatal life. Id. at 661. Roe
v. Wade has been cited by courts taking the opposite position as well. Id. at 656-
58. Certainly, principles established in Roe prohibit denial of a wrongful death
recovery. Id. at 659. For a discussion of various state interests in protecting
potential life, see Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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mined that a fetus can be a person under state law in some contexts. 4
A similar debate exists over whether a fetus can be considered a person for
purposes of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Note, 34 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1029, 1029-33 (1983). Section 1983 allows any person to bring a civil ac-
tion against one who, under color of law, has deprived that person of any rights,
privileges, or immunities available under the Constitution or state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The majority of decisions deny a fetus protection under
§ 1983 relying, in part, on Roe v. Wade. Note, supra, at 1052-65. However, a
narrow reading of the Roe decision could restrict its holding to defeating at-
tempts to define a fetus as a person under the fourteenth amendment only, thus
permitting the courts to define the term person as including a fetus for § 1983
purposes. Id. See also Rice, Fetal Rights: Defining "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 356-57. See generally, Annot., 64 A.L.R. FED. 879, 886
(1983). For a related argument in the wrongful death context, see Kader, supra,
at 656.
For a discussion of some of the possible ramifications of finding a fetus to
be a person under the Constitution, see Parness, Social Commentary: Values and
Legal Personhood, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 487, 500-03 (1980-198 1) (discussing possibil-
ity of suits against parents for prenatal negligence, state custody orders to pro-
tect fetuses, homicide prosecutions for abortions and parental feticide).
4. See Reskin, Two States Maintain the Status Quo, A.B.A. J. March 1986, at
104. Reskin suggests that, in a civil context, state courts are willing to define
"person" to include a fetus, yet in the criminal context such willingness is rare.
Id.
For a breakdown of the courts' interpretations of whether a fetus is a person
in the area of wrongful death, see infra notes 6-7. See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d
1222, 1228 (1971) (virtually all jurisdictions allow actions for damages for pre-
natal injuries where injured fetus is subsequently born alive).
The vast majority of courts do not interpret criminal statutes involving
homicide to include fetuses within the term person or human being. See, e.g.,
Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 480, 23 So. 671 (1897) (murder statute inapplicable
when victim is fetus); State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(fetus not covered by vehicular homicide statute); White v. State, 238 Ga. 224,
232 S.E.2d 57 (1977) (homicide requires live birth of victim); Hollis v. Common-
wealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) (no provision for murder of fetus); State v.
Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979) (despite legislative amendment, murder does
not include killing of fetus); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d
775 (1980) (person as used in vehicular homicide statute excludes fetuses); Min-
nesota v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985) (vehicular homicide law does not
include fetuses); State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 287 N.W.2d 59 (1980) (homicide
does not include killing of unborn); New Jersey ex rel. A.W.S., 182 N.J. Super.
278, 440 A.2d 1144 (1981) (causing death of fetus not vehicular homicide); State
v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d 1222 (1982) (not vehicular homicide where
death caused is that of fetus); People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23
(1949) (murder statute inapplicable where fetus is killed); State v. Dickinson, 28
Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971) (fetus not within term "person" as used
in vehicular homicide statute); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982) (fetus
not person for purposes of vehicular homicide law); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn.
417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923) (independent existence from mother required before
murder laws applicable); Harris v. State, 28 Tex. Crim. 308, 12 S.W. 1102
(1889) (murder conviction requires victim's live birth and independent exist-
ence); State v. Larson, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978) (vehicular homicide law does
not include fetuses); Lane v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 509, 248 S.E.2d 781
(1978) (no provisions in homicide laws for killing of fetus); Huebner v. State,
131 Wis. 162, 111 N.W. 63 (1907) (killing of fetus not homicide); Bennett v.
State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963) (manslaughter does not include killing of un-
born child). But see Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324
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The issue of whether a fetus is a person for purposes of a wrongful
death statute has caused a split among the state courts, with a majority
of jurisdictions holding that a viable fetus 5 is a person whose death is
compensable under a wrongful death statute. 6 Several states, however,
(1984) (term "person" does include viable fetus for purposes of vehicular homi-
cide statute).
Where the state homicide statutes do not explicitly include an unborn child
within the definition of homicide, other laws, such as a feticide statute or the
general abortion law, usually provide for some type of criminal sanction for kill-
ing a fetus. See Note, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable Feticide as Murder, 17
IND. L. REV. 1119, 1142 (1984). However, the penalties under such provisions
are typically much less severe. Id. at 1119.
Some states have expressly included fetuses within their homicide statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 9-1.1 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7) (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-201 (1) (Supp. 1983). But see Comment, Feticide in Illinois: Legislative Ame-
lioration of a Common Law Rule, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 91, 103-05 (1984) (discussing
state of law in Louisiana where, despite statutory amendment, killing of fetus is
not homicide); see also, Case Note, Feticide Is Still Legal In Louisiana, 26 Loy. L.
REV. 422 (1980).
5. Viability is defined as that stage of fetal development where the fetus can
survive independent of the mother. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (citing L. HELLMAN & J.
PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971) and DORLANDS' ILLUS-
TRATED MED. DICTIONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965)). Whether a fetus is viable is a
factual issue that will not be considered in this Note. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, the term "fetus" will be used to represent a viable fetus.
Commentators have focused on various problems involving the Roe Court's
use of viability as a legal criterion. For example, the attending physician is
placed in the position of determining whether a fetus is viable, and thus,
whether an abortion is legal. Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 128-
29. However, the doctor is given no guidance about whether a fetus is capable
of surviving outside the womb and is forced to rely on any of a number of impre-
cise measures, including fetal weight, fetal lung development, and fetal age. Id.
at 130-33, 139-44. Some current proposals to replace the viability criterion sug-
gest using conception, live birth, "brain birth" (the capacity of intelligence) and
quickening (when the fetus is capable of movement) as criteria. Id. at 144-47.
6. See, e.g., Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich
v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v.
Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26
Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50
Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d
100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafoge-
orgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Il. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150
Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1970); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1
(1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Dannos v. St. Pierre, 402
So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964);
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Verken-
nes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainy v. Horn, 221 Miss.
269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983);
White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619
P.2d 826 (1980), modified on other grounds, 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980);
Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St.
3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976);
Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Ore. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Amadio v.
Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I.
672
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take the position that a stillborn fetus never achieves the status of a
"person" and, therefore, no liability arises for causing its death. 7 This
Note will focus on the present state of the law regarding wrongful death
recovery for the death of a fetus. Further, this Note will consider the
various interpretations among the states of what are essentially similar
wrongful death laws." Finally, this Note will focus on three primary jus-
tifications underpinning the decisions on this issue and will propose a
177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42
(1964); Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985);.Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980);
Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher,
155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 34 Wisc. 2d 14, 148 N.E.2d 107 (1967).
7. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d
259 (Iowa 1981); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977); Graf
v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394,
146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958) (abrogated by statute, 4 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980) (for pur-
poses of wrongful death statute, person includes viable fetus)); Lawrence v. Cra-
ven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969). Contra Dunn v. Rose Way,
Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983) (Iowa Supreme Court allowed parents of via-
ble fetus to recover damages under Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which allows par-
ents to recover for death of "minor child").
Finally, it should be noted that the United States District Court in Alaska
has held that no recovery is permitted for the wrongful death of a nonviable
fetus; however, no Alaska state court decisions have considered wrongful death
cases involving the death of either viable or nonviable fetuses. See Mace v. Jung,
210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962).
8. Wrongful death statutes should be distinguished from survival statutes.
Most wrongful death statutes are modeled after Lord Campbell's Fatal Accidents
Act of 1846, and create a new cause of action in the decedent's representative
for the benefit of certain designated persons. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAw OF TORTS 945-46 (5th ed. 1984); see also Smedley, supra note 1, at 273-75.
The pertinent provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, also known as Lord
Campbell's Act, are as follows:
[W]hensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by a wrongful Act, Neglect
or Default, and the Act, Neglect or Default is such as would (if death had
not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an Action and recover
Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case, the Person who
would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for
Damages, notwithstanding the death of the Person injured, and
although the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances
as amount in Law to Felony.
Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (emphasis
added).
By comparison, survival statutes preserve any causes of action vested in the
decedent prior to death; no new cause of action is created. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra, at 942-43; Smedley, supra note 1, at 274-77. The decedent's own
cause of action merely passes on to the decedent's estate. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra, at 949-50.
For the purposes of this Note, any reference to a wrongful death statute
shall mean a Lord Campbell type wrongful death statute unless otherwise
indicated.
1986] NOTE
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method of constructing the typical wrongful death statute that will en-
able courts to allow recovery without engaging in questionable inquiries
into the legislative intent underlying the use of the term "person."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Right to Recover for Wrongful Death
The right of a third party to recover damages for the death of an-
other human being did not exist at common law. 9 The basis for the
common law preclusion is the felony-merger doctrine, which prohibited
a civil recovery for an act that also constituted a felony.' 0 To offset the
common law, every state has promulgated wrongful death legislation,
thus permitting a civil cause of action where previously none existed. I'
9. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). Most American juris-
dictions adopted the Bolton rule. See, e.g., Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S.
754 (1877); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So. 104 (191 1);Jackson v. Pitts-
burgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 140 Ind. 241, 39 N.E. 663 (1895); Major v. Bur-
lington, C.R. & N.R.R. Co., 115 Iowa 309, 88 N.W. 815 (1902); Carey v.
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848) (overruled in Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass.
60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972)).
Prior to England's Fatal Accidents Act, a few states, Kentucky, Arkansas,
Michigan, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, had carved out their own
statutory exceptions to the Bolton rule. See Malone, American Fatal Accident Stat-
utes-Part I: The Legislative Birth Pains, 1965 DUKE L.J. 673, 674-76. By the mid-
1800s, the state legislatures' focus turned toward compensating the families of
those killed in all too common railroad accidents. Id. at 678.
The reason behind the near universal adoption of the Bolton rule is not read-
ily apparent and, indeed, a few cases allowed recovery for the death of a family
member despite the Bolton holding. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17
STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1062-67 (1964-1965) [hereinafter cited as Malone, Genesis].
For a discussion of the basis of the Bolton rule, see infra notes 10 & 11. See also
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605
(1959-1960).
10. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382-84 (1970). In
England, the courts did not allow a civil recovery because an individual found
liable for a homicide was himself put to death, with his belongings forfeited to
the Crown. Id. at 382-83. Thus, there were no assets remaining from which to
pay off a subsequent civil judgment. Id. For a historical analysis of the Bolton
rule, see Holdsworth, supra note 1.
The adoption of the common law rule by American courts seems strange
since the felony-merger doctrine never existed here. See Summerfield v. Supe-
rior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 471, 698 P.2d 712, 716 (1985); Malone, Genesis, supra
note 9, at 1063. Massachusetts "set the pattern" for adopting the Bolton rule in
Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848). Malone, Genesis, supra note 9, at
1067. While the Carey decision articulated no reason for adopting the rule, one
possible explanation is that Carey involved a claim by the decedent's widow; un-
like the early American cases where recovery was allowed, a wife has no property
interest in her husband. Id. at 1067-69. Therefore, she could not sue for her
husband's injuries whether fatal or not. See id.
11. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 945. For a state by state
breakdown of the statutes that address the issue of the wrongful death of a fetus
as well as the terminology used in the various statutes, see Note, A Century of
Change: Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22 WASHBURN LJ. 268, 282-85 (1983). Mas-
sachusetts and Hawaii, however, do recognize a common law basis for a wrong-
674
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The wrongful death legislation of most states is modeled after the
original Fatal Accidents Act. 12 In analyzing these statutes, state courts
have identified two basic elements: (1) that the death be of a person,
and (2) that the conduct causing death be of a type that would have
entitled the decedent to sue had death not occurred. 13 Since nearly
every statute is silent regarding whether the term person includes or
excludes a fetus, the state courts have had to rely on statutory construc-
tion to determine whether the death of a fetus is compensable under a
wrongful death act.' 4 The process of statutory construction in this re-
gard has led to much disagreement among the state courts.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
ampton, 15 was the first court to consider whether a fetus is a person for
purposes of a wrongful death statute. The Dietrich court held that a non-
viable 16 fetus is not a person with standing to sue in court. 17 The court
ful death suit. See Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 443, 369 P.2d 96
(1961) (explicitly rejecting Bolton holding) ; Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60,
284 N.E.2d 222 (1972) (following United States Supreme Court ruling in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1969), that courts can adopt leg-
islative policy as common law).
12. See, e.g., White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 532, 458 P.2d 617, 620 (1969);
Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 863-64 (N.D. 1984); Presley v. Newport
Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 180, 365 A.2d 748, 750 (1976); Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 139, 169 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1969). For the text of Lord Camp-
bell's Act, see supra note 8.
The texts of the Nevada and Washington statutes do not parallel the Fatal
Accidents Act in that they omit the language referring to an act by the defendant
that would enable the decedent to sue "if death had not ensued." See, e.g., NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.010 (1977). How-
ever, the fact that suit is authorized reveals that this clause is implicit. By com-
parison, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Virginia all adopted the "if death had
not ensued" phraseology. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (Supp. 1985); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 10-7-1 (1985); VA. CODE § 8.01-50 (1984).
What is important is not the exact terminology of a statute, but whether the
statute is the Lord Campbell type that creates a new cause of action in the dece-
dent's representative, as opposed to the survival type that only preserves the
victim's cause of action. See Smedley, supra note 1, at 273-77. For a discussion
of the differences between survival type and Lord Campbell type statutes, see
supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 864 (N.D. 1984); Presley
v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 180, 365 A.2d 748, 750 (1976); Lawrence v.
Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 140, 169 S.E.2d 440, 441 (1969). The Presley
court added a third requirement: that the act causing death be performed by a
person other than the decedent. Presley, 117 R.I. at 180-81, 365 A.2d at 750.
14. For a list of the decisions interpreting wrongful death legislation to in-
clude or exempt unborn children from coverage, see supra notes 6-7.
15. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
16. Although the facts indicate that the child was born alive and lived for 10
to 15 minutes, the fetus was "nonviable." Id. at 15. The fetus, which was four to
five months in development, was injured when the mother slipped and fell on a
town road. Id. at 14-15. Her fall allegedly triggered a miscarriage and, while it
was born alive, the fetus was too underdeveloped to survive. Id.
17. Id. at 17. The court stated that even had the child survived, it could not
sue for any injuries suffered prenatally. Id. at 15-16. This conclusion, however,
19861 NOTE 675
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concluded that a fetus is merely part of its mother and has no separate
identity until it is born; therefore, an injury to the fetus is really only an
injury to the mother. 18 Thus, the court declared that the sole cause of
action belongs to the mother. 19
Sixteen years later, at the turn of the century, Justice Boggs first
articulated opposition to the Dietrich rule in his dissenting opinion in
Allaire v. Saint Luke's Hospital.20 Justice Boggs argued that once a fetus
reaches a stage of development where it is capable of living apart from
its mother, it is no longer reasonable to conclude that the fetus is only
part of its mother.2 1 The district court for the District of Columbia sub-
sequently adopted Boggs' viability theory in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 22 in which
the court allowed recovery for injuries sustained by a viable fetus during
delivery. 2
3
is clearly invalid today. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Lieber v. Our Lady
of Victory Hosp., 43 App. Div. 2d 898, 351 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1974); Sinkler v.
Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220
A.2d 222 (1966); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d
835 (1962). See generally, Annot. 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971) (right of action for
prenatal injuries is well established); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869
(1977) (tortfeasor liability for prenatal torts). Justice Holmes refrained from
drawing a line for recovery at a point before birth because there was no indica-
tion of where to draw such a line. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16.
18. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17.
19. Id. The Dietrich decision also noted that any injuries to the fetus caused
by the mother's fall could be recovered by the mother in a separate action, so
long as her injuries were not too remote. Id. The court noted that this conclu-
sion normally followed from the underlying assumption that the fetus is part of
the mother. Id. For a discussion of the argument that the parents can bring
their own action, which is still advanced by a few courts, see infra notes 100 &
154 and accompanying text.
At least one jurisdiction, Florida, still abides by the Deitrich reasoning. Flor-
ida law requires the complete expulsion or removal of the child from the
mother, as well as proof that the umbilical cord had been severed and that the
child had had independent circulation of blood, before the child is considered a
person born alive. Case Note, A Child Is Not Born Alive Until He or She Acquires An
Existence Separate And Independent From the Mother-Duncan v. Flynn, 8 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 137, 139 (1980).
20. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting). In Allaire, the
fetus was injured when its mother was pinned between an elevator car and the
elevator shaft. Id. at 361-62, 56 N.E. at 638. The child was born alive, but de-
formed. Id. Accordingly, Allaire did not involve a wrongful death action.
21. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
22. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Like the Allaire court, the Bonbrest court
did not reach the question of wrongful death. Id. at 142. Instead, it involved
prenatal injury to a fetus due to the negligent treatment of the mother by the
defendant physicians. Id. at 139. The issue was whether the physicians owed
any duty to an unborn child. Id.
23. Id. at 140. The district court relied upon Justice Boggs' reasoning to
conclude that it would be contradictory to consider a fetus, capable of life in-
dependent of the mother, to be a part of the mother. Id. at 141. The court also
emphasized that the physicians inflicted the injury directly upon the fetus during
8
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Shortly thereafter, Minnesota became the first state to allow a
wrongful death action for negligence that resulted in the stillbirth of a
viable fetus, in Verkennes v. Corniea.24 In Verkennes, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota relied almost entirely upon Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire
and upon the Bonbrest opinion to conclude that "[it seems too plain for.
argument that where independent existence is possible and life is de-
stroyed through a wrongful act a cause of action arises under the stat-
utes .... "25
From Justice Boggs' dissent in Allaire, and the subsequent decisions
in Verkennes and Bonbrest, a majority position has evolved allowing a
wrongful death recovery for fatal injuries inflicted upon a fetus. 26
delivery, thus distinguishing Dietrich, where the injury was "transmitted"
through the mother. Id. at 140. The cases no longer distinguished between
injury inflicted directly upon the fetus or transmitted through the mother. For a
list of the courts rejecting the Dietrich reasoning, see supra note 6.
24. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). Unlike Bonbrest, Verkennes in-
volved an initial injury to the mother; the defendant physician's negligence re-
sulted in both the death of the mother and her fetus when the mother's uterus
ruptured during delivery. Id. at 366-67, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
25. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
26. For a list of the courts taking the majority position, see supra note 6.
At least three courts have rejected the viability distinction in deciding how
developed the fetus must be before a wrongful death recovery is permissible. In
a case dealing with a pre-Roe abortion statute, Indiana abandoned its original
fetal wrongful death decision, which limited recovery to cases where the fetus
was quick, and apparently now recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death
of a fetus from the point of conception. See Cheaney v. Indiana, 259 Ind. 138,
145-46, 285 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (case aris-
ing in pre-Roe abortion context).
Another court has explicitly adopted the point of conception as the point at
which one becomes a person for purposes of a wrongful death statute. Presley v.
Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). In Presley, the court held
that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception. Id. at 188-89, 365 A.2d
at 754. The Presley court felt that the viability distinction was illogical. Id. at 188,
365 A.2d at 752-53.
By comparison, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a fetus is a per-
son from the time that it becomes "quick," that is, capable of movement. Porter
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 716-17, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102-03 (1975). In allowing
a cause of action for the death of a four and one-half month old fetus, the Porter
court based its holding on a Georgia Supreme Court ruling that allowed recov-
ery for prenatal injuries to a quick fetus. Id., 87 S.E.2d 102-03 (citing Tucker v.
Carmichael, 208 Ga. 201, 203-04, 65 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1951)).
Many of the cases limiting a cause of action to the death of a viable fetus
either did not consider whether recovery could be allowed for non-viable fe-
tuses, or explicitly withheld deciding the issue. See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103
Idaho 570, 574, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (1982) (court withheld judgment concerning
nonviable fetuses); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 185, 198 A.2d 71, 73
(1964) (dividing line for recovery should be drawn "at least" at viability); Moen
v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 601, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (1975) (no decision ren-
dered concerning nonviable fetus).
In addition, an appellate court in Texas allowed recovery for the death of a
fetus without indicating how advanced the pregnancy was. See Witty v. American
General Capital Distributors, 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). However it
appears that the fetus was not viable, being only 4 months at the time of death.
9
Starczewski: Wrongful Death of a Fetus: Does a Cause of Action Arise When Ther
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
678 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 :p. 669
B. The Present State of the Cause of Action for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus
Although a majority of courts agree that recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus is permissible, the justifications proffered by these
courts are quite divergent. 2 7 Similarly, although a distinct minority of
courts deny a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus, these
courts advance diverse justifications. 28 Additionally, it is not uncom-
mon for courts in either the majority or the minority to assert several
justifications in support of their position.2 9
1. Majority Position
a. Legislature Intended to Provide for Recovery for the Wrongful
Death of a Fetus
The acceptance of any common law basis for a right to recover for
wrongful death is relatively rare. 30 Therefore, the courts are left with
the task of interpreting Lord Campbell-type wrongful death legislation
to determine whether the legislature intended to allow a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a fetus.3 ' One approach in this respect is
See Note, A Wrongful Death Action Can Be Maintained For Prenatal Injuries Causing the
Stillbirth of a Fetus, 17 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983 (1986).
Finally, Illinois now permits, by statute, a cause of action for the death of a
fetus from the moment of conception. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2.2 (Supp.
1985). For a discussion of the Illinois approach, see Parness, Protection of Poten-
tial Human Life in Illinois: Policy and Law at Odds, 5 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 1, 22-28
(1985) (analyzing development of cause of action for death of fetus).
27. For a discussion of the rationales advanced by courts in the majority,
see infra notes 30-83 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the rationales underlying the minority position, see
infra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712
(1985) (en banc) (allowing cause of action); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564,
565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (en banc) (denying cause of action for
wrongful death of fetus); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985)
(adopting majority position allowing recovery).
30. For a discussion of a possible common law basis for the recovery of
wrongful death damages, see infra notes 74-80 and 86-90 and accompanying
text.
For an argument encouraging a common law approach to allowing recovery
in order to avoid the complexities of statutory construction, see Note, Wrongful
Death and the Stillborn Fetus: A Common Law Solution to a Statutory Dilemma, 43 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 819, 830-35 (1981-1982). There are, however, problems inherent
in this approach, namely the historical acceptance of the Bolton rule and the pre-
clusion of the field through legislation. See id. at 831-32.
31. See, e.g.,Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 576, 565 P.2d 122, 129, 139
Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1977) (en banc) (quoting Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co.,
164 Cal. 564, 568, 129 P. 989, 992 (1913)) ("Because it is a creature of statute,
the cause of action for wrongful death 'exists only so far ... as the legislative
power may declare.' "); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 1977) (court
"confined to a determination of the legislature's intent"); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199
Neb. 573, 576, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977) (quoting Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
155 Neb. 17, 23-24, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951)) (since no common recovery is
recognized, cause of action "may not be maintained unless ... it is afforded by
10
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demonstrated by the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in Hopkins
v. McBane. 32 In that case, the court held that the ordinary definition of a
person includes a fetus. 33 The court then determined that the ordinary
definition controls when construing the wrongful death statute.3 4
A second approach taken by courts in determining the legislative
intent behind a wrongful death statute is to analogize to the protections
accorded fetuses in other areas of law.3 5 For example, in Summerfield v.
Superior Court,36 the Supreme Court of Arizona relied, in part, on the
state's manslaughter,3 7 abortion 3 8 and property laws 39 to determine
whether the legislature intended to provide a cause of action for the
death of a fetus. 40 The court found an overall legislative policy to pro-
vide protection for fetuses and concluded that allowing recovery was
legislative enactment"); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 239, 319 S.W.2d
221, 223 (1958) (abrogated by statute) ("Where a right of action is dependent
upon the provisions of a statute ... [the court is] not privileged to create such a
right under the guise of a liberal interpretation of it."); Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 141-42, 169 S.E.2d 440,442 (1969) (quoting both Drabbels and
Hogan).
32. 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984). McBane involved a malpractice suit filed
by the mother of a viable fetus. Id. at 863. The trial court had granted the
defendant physician's motion for summary judgment. Id. For a further discus-
sion of McBane, see Wrongful Death, 61 N.D.L. REv. 104 (1985).
33. McBane, 359 N.W.2d at 865. The court relied, in part, on a statute that
defined an unborn child to be a person to the extent necessary to protect the
child's interests in the event of his or her birth. Id. at 864. Aside from holding
that the normal meaning of the term "person" is understood to include the un-
born, the court reasoned that a fetus is alive before birth, and can therefore
experience death before birth. See Wrongful Death, supra note 32, at 105.
Like the court of North Dakota, the courts in Georgia have also found that
the English common law definition of a person includes fetuses that are capable
of movement. See Tucker v. Carmichael, 208 Ga. 201, 203-04, 65 S.E.2d 909,
911-12 (1951).
34. McBane, 359 N.W.2d at 865.
35. See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982) (drawing
from state's intestacy laws); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698
P.2d 712 (1985) (en banc) (relying on Arizona's manslaughter and abortion stat-
utes and on property laws).
36. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (en banc). In Summerfield, the par-
ents of a full-term child brought a malpractice action. Id. at 470, 698 P.2d at
715. The basis of the complaint was the defendant's failure to treat the mother's
diabetes which was the cause of the fetus' death. Id.
37. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(5) (Supp. 1985) (manslaughter in-
cludes knowingly or recklessly causing death of fetus at any stage of develop-
ment if death stems from injury to mother that would have been murder had
mother died).
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01(C) (Supp. 1985) (requirement that
second physician attend abortion procedure of viable fetus for purposes of pre-
serving life of any viable fetus born alive).
39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (1975) (relatives of decedent con-
ceived before decedent's death inherit as any other relative upon their birth).
40. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721.
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consistent with this policy.4 ' Similarly, in Volk v. Baldazo,42 the Idaho
Supreme Court relied on Idaho's intestacy laws in finding a legislative
intent to protect fetuses. 43
Yet another argument, made in O'Grady v. Brown,44 is that the legis-
lature implicitly intended to include a fetus within the coverage of the
wrongful death statute because the legislative policy behind such stat-
utes would be advanced only if recovery were allowed. 4 5 The Missouri
statute at issue in O'Grady had a two-fold purpose: (1) compensating the
decedent's survivors, and (2) deterring harmfil conduct by ensuring
that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions. 4 6 The court
observed that a denial of recovery for the death of a fetus frustrates both
of these goals, since, in the absence of recovery, parents are not com-
pensated and tortfeasors are not deterred. 4 7
41. Id.
42. 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982).
43. Id. at 574, 651 P.2d at 14. The Idaho statute involved allowed parents
to bring an action for the wrongful death of their minor children. Id. The court
held that no minimum age requirement is implied in the statute because, tradi-
tionally, a viable fetus has legal rights. Id. For a discussion of the inconsistencies
involved when legislation protects the interest of unborn children in the areas of
tort, criminal and property law while allowing abortion, see Note, The Law and
the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349
(1971).
44. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983).
45. Id. at 908-10. The lawsuit arose when the mother's uterus ruptured due
to alleged negligent treatment, and the full-term fetus was stillborn. Id. at 906.
For discussions of O'Grady, see Casenote, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Viable
Fetus in Missouri, 52 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 692 (1983-1984) [hereinafter cited as
Casenote, Recovery]; Casenote, Wrongful Death- "Person, " As Used in Missouri's
Wrongful Death Statute, Includes a Viable Human Fetus, 22 J. FAM. L. 770 (1983-
1984).
46. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908-10. For a discussion of the legislative pur-
poses of Missouri's statute, see Casenote, Recovery, supra note 45, at 701. Other
jurisdictions have made similar policy analyses. See Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 479,
698 P.2d at 721; Volk, 103 Idaho at 574, 651 P.2d at 14-15.
The O'Grady court also relied upon a now repealed Missouri feticide statute
for support. See Casenote, Recovery, supra note 45, at 772. For a discussion of
legislation protecting the unborn and the relevance of such statutes in the
wrongful death field, see supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
In contrast to the compensatory statutes discussed above, Alabama has a
punitive statute. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 946. Despite the
punitive purpose of its statute, Alabama has also held that by allowing recovery
for the death of a fetus, the purpose of its statute is fulfilled. Eich v. Town of
Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974). For a commentary on
the Eich case, see Recent Decisions, Wrongful Death-Prenatal Injuries, 5 CUM.-SAM.
L. REV. 362 (1974-1975). For a further discussion of punitive damages in this
context, see Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37
VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984).
Several other jurisdictions have occasionally recognized the availability of
punitive damages even though their wrongful death statutes are compensatory
in nature. See id. at 1149-50. The trend to allow punitive damages in a survival
action is even greater. Id. at 1150-51.
47. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908. See also Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293
680 [Vol. 31 :p. 669
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A second line of cases that analyzes legislative intent focuses upon
the second prong of a Lord Campbell-type statute, namely the require-
ment that a decedent have had the right to sue for the act that caused
death had death not occurred. 48 This analysis evolved through the inter-
pretation of two related Iowa statutes: Iowa's wrongful death statute 49
and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8.50 First, in Weitl v. Moes, 5 ' the court
interpreted the wrongful death statute to be a survival type statute that
merely preserves any cause of action that the decedent had at the time of
death. 5 2 The Weitl court reasoned that since the fetus had never been
born alive, it could not have brought a law suit at the time of its death
and, therefore, no cause of action was preserved. 53
Subsequent to Weitl, the same court allowed a father to recover
damages for the death of his unborn child in Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc. 54 In
Ala. 95, 98, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974) (allowing cause of action furthers statu-
tory purpose of deterring harmful conduct); Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 476, 698
P.2d at 721 (allowing suit furthers legislative policies of compensating survivors
and protecting unborn); Volk, 103 Idaho at 574, 651 P.2d at 14-15 (purpose of
statute is deterrence). By comparison, the North Carolina Supreme Court, not-
ing the compensatory nature of its wrongful death statute, denied recovery in
Gay v. Thompson, stating "it can hardly be seriously contended that the death of a
foetus represents any real pecuniary loss to the parents." 266 N.C. 394, 399,
.146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966) (quoting Comment, Developments in the Law of Prenatal
Wrongful Death, 69 DICK. L. REV. 258, 267 (1965)) (emphasis in original).
48. For a discussion of the cases focusing on the second element of a cause
of action under the Lord Campbell-type statute, see infra notes 49-73 & 100-03
and accompanying text.
49. 47 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (West 1976) ("When a wrongful act pro-
duces death, damages recovered therefor shall be disposed of as personal prop-
erty belonging to the estate of the deceased .... ). For a discussion of the
various statutes that are applicable in a "wrongful death" action under Iowa law,
see Fitzgerald v. Hale, 247 Iowa 1194, 1196-97, 78 N.W.2d 509, 510-11 (1956).
50. IowA R. Civ. P. 8 ("a parent may sue for the expense and actual loss of
services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor
child").
51. 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981). In Weitl, Linda Weitl received treatment
for bronchitis and hyperventilation. Id. at 261. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, the treating physicians and the hospital, were negligent. Id. Plain-
tiffs further alleged that defendants' negligence caused Mrs. Weitl to suffer brain
damage and blindness and caused her late-term child to be stillborn. Id. Weitl's
three children brought a loss of society claim on which they ultimately prevailed.
See Note, Child's Right to Sue for Negligent Disruption of Parental Consortium, 22 WASH-
BURN L.J. 78, 91-93 (1982-1983). Linda Weitl's husband brought suit for wrong-
ful death which the court dismissed. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 273.
52. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270.
53. Id. at 270-71. The court also focused on earlier versions of the wrong-
ful death statute in support of its claim that a child, never being born alive, can-
not have a cause of action to pass on to the parents. Id. at 272. An earlier
version of the statute stated that the causes of action of a party do not die with
the party. Id. The court concluded that a fetus could not be a party to a tort
action. Id. Thus, the statute had always been construed to exclude recovery for
fetal deaths. Id.
54. 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983). The plaintiff's wife, unborn child and
two-year old daughter were all killed in an automobile accident. Id. at 831.
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Dunn, the father sued under Rule 8 of Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allows parents to sue for the death of a minor child. 55 The reason
the court allowed the suit in Dunn but not in Weitl is the different nature
of the Iowa wrongful death action and an action pursuant to rule 8: the
Dunn court interpreted rule 8 to involve a right of the parents to recover
for the harm suffered by them due to the death of their child, and not a
right of the decedent. 5 6 The effect of Dunn is that the legal status of the
fetus becomes irrelevant since the person whose standing is at issue is
the parents. 57
In the same year the Iowa Supreme Court decided Dunn, the
O'Grady court adopted a similar type of analysis. 58 Missouri's wrongful
death statute, like the wrongful death statute of many other states,5 9
premises recovery by a survivor on the requirement that "if death had
not ensued," the decedent would have been "entitled . .. to recover
Among the numerous counts that the plaintiff brought were three counts seek-
ing recovery under Iowa's wrongful death law and three counts seeking damages
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Id. These six counts were based on the
death of the viable fetus. Id. The lower court dismissed all the claims for the
unborn child's death. Id. at 830. Relying on Weitl, the Iowa Supreme Court
upheld the dismissal of the wrongful death action. Id. at 831. However, the
court ruled that since rule 8 provides an action for the damages of the parents, a
rule 8 claim for the death of a viable fetus is permissible, Weitl notwithstanding.
Id. at 832-33.
For a discussion of Dunn, as well as a comparison of rule 8 with Iowa's
wrongful death statute, see Casenote, Surviving Parents Have a Claim Under Rule 8
of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure for Damages Resultingfrom Deprivation of an Unborn
Child's Companionship, Society and Services, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 185 (1983-1984);
Comment, Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc.: No Recovery for Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus
Under Section 611.20 of the Iowa Code, 70 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1984-1985).
55. See Dunn, 333 N.W.2d 830. For the language of rule 8, in comparison to
Iowa's wrongful death statute, see supra notes 49-50.
56. Dunn, 333 N.W.2d at 832-34. The predecessor to rule 8 was intended
to compensate the father, and sometimes the mother, for the expenses and loss
of services that they incur as a result of their minor child's death. See Comment,
supra note 54, at 549-50. Such damages were not recoverable under Iowa's
"wrongful death statute" because that statute allowed only the decedent's estate
to recover damages suffered by the decedent. Id. at 548. Iowa's wrongful death
statute is a hybrid statute-originally it was enacted as a survival statute. Id.
However, it does contain some wrongful death elements. Id.
57. See Dunn, 333 N.W.2d at 832-33. The legal status of the fetus refers to
whether the fetus had a right to sue at the time of its death. Id. The defendants
in Dunn had asserted that under settled Iowa law, a fetus has no legal status. See
Casenote, supra note 54, at 190. The majority easily dismissed this argument by
noting that the legal status of the parent, rather than that of the fetus, was deter-
minative. Id.
58. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910-11. While not citing Dunn for this proposi-
tion, the court noted the wrongful death action was a new action and not one
belonging to the decedent. Id. at 910. The decedent's right to sue at the time of
death is irrelevant to the extent that the wrongful death action is not derivative.
Id.
59. For a discussion of various examples of wrongful death legislation, see
supra notes 12-13.
14
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damages .... -60 Although noting that other courts have conditioned
recovery on the existence of a right to sue either at the time of injury or
the time of death, 6 1 the court interpreted the "if death had not ensued"
language to allow recovery for any act by the defendant that would have
given the decedent a legally cognizable action "but-for" his or her
death. 6 2 Again, as under the Dunn analysis, the court deemed irrelevant
the ability of the fetus to bring suit because the court found that Mis-
souri's wrongful death action creates a new cause of action that belongs
to the survivors, not the decedent's estate. 6 3 If the injured fetus could
have sued during its life had it been born and survived, then the survi-
vors have a cause of action under the statute. 64
The most recent decision allowing a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death of a fetus is Amadio v. Levin. 65 In Amadio, the parents of the
decedent alleged that the negligence of four treating physicians caused
their full-term child to be stillborn. 6 6 Although the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court interprets its wrongful death statute as being "basically
60. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1982).
61. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910. For a discussion of the minority position
which conditions recovery on the existence of a right to sue at the time of death,
see infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
62. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910. The Summerfield court explicitly adopted
this but-for test as well. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 475, 698 P.2d at 720 (citing
O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910). For a discussion of the Summerfield approach, see
infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
63. O'Grady, 654 S.W. 2d at 910. The Missouri court reinforced its position
by noting that the term "person" implicitly includes fetuses, because such an
interpretation is the only one consistent with legislative policy. Id. at 908-09.
For a discussion of this aspect of O'Grady, see supra notes 45-47 and accompany-
ing text.
64. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910. The but-for requirement was easily satis-
fied because under established Missouri law, a fetus injured in utero that survives
birth has a cause of action for its injuries. See Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224,
258 S.W.2d 577 (1953). In reaching its decision, the O'Grady court specifically
rejected the holding in Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910
(citing Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969)). The
O'Grady court noted that while Virginia's wrongful death statute is a survival type
statute, which merely preserves the decedent's own causes of action, Missouri's
wrongful death statute creates a new cause of action. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at
910. Thus, the decedent need not have actually had a legally cognizable cause of
action at the time of death. Id. For a discussion of the Lawrence court approach,
see infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
The focus of the O'Grady court's analysis was the nature of the defendant's
conduct, not the legal status of the decedent at the time of death. See O'Grady,
654 S.W.2d at 910. Among other courts, there is some disagreement concern-
ing the time the action actually accrues. Compare Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md.
179, 186, 198 A.2d 71, 74 (1964) (Gray, J., dissenting) (action accrues at time
injury first occurs) with Lawrence, 210 Va. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (action ac-
crues at time death occurs).
65. 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
66. Id. at 200, 501 A.2d at 1085-86.
15
Starczewski: Wrongful Death of a Fetus: Does a Cause of Action Arise When Ther
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
derivative" in nature,6 7 it still followed the general reasoning of O'Grady
and Dunn.6 8 The majority argued in Amadio, that since recovery is al-
lowed in instances of prenatal injury, this implicitly means that an un-
born child is an "individual" with a right to be free from prenatal
injuries; 6 9 if a fetus is an individual at the time of injury it is also an
individual at the time those injuries happen to cause death. 70
Similarly, in Summerfield, the court explicitly adopted the "but-for"
test advanced in O'Grady.7 1 The Arizona court stated that but for the
fact that death had occurred, the fetus would have been born alive and
would have been entitled to sue for the prenatal injuries. 72 Under this
approach, a fetus fits within the statutory language that requires the de-
cedent to have had the right to sue had death not occurred. 7 3
b. The Possibility of a Common Law Basis for Wrongful
Death Recovery
Although no court has relied on it in allowing a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a fetus, a few courts have suggested a possible
common law basis for wrongful death action.74 If a common law cause
67. See Carrol v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 48, 202 A.2d 9, 10 (1964). Carrol was
overruled by Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
68. The court relied on Sinkler v. Kneale, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a fetus is an "individual" for purposes of permitting an action
for prenatal injuries. Id. at 204, 501 A.2d at 1087 (citing Sinkler v. Kneale, 401
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960)).
69. Id. at 204, 501 A.2d at 1087. The court did not specify whether this
holding is limited to viable fetuses. Id. at 199-208, 501 A.2d at 1085-89. How-
ever, the opinion implied recovery is available from conception in that the court
interpreted Sinkler as holding "that a child en ventre sa mere is a separate indi-
vidual from the moment of conception .... Id. at 204, 501 A.2d at 1087.
70. Id.
71. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 475, 698 P.2d at 720 (citing O'Grady v. Brown,
654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983)).
72. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 475, 698 P.2d at 720.
73. Id.
74. See Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 114 (1962);
Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972). Nevertheless, most
state courts recognize only a statutory right to recover for wrongful death. See,
e.g., Huebner v. Deuchle, 109 Ariz. 549, 550, 514 P.2d 470, 471 (1973) (right to
recover wrongful death damages wholly statutory and can be granted or with-
held at pleasure of legislature); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 573-74, 565
P.2d 122, 127-28, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102-03 (1977) (throughout California's his-
tory, court has embraced view that no common law action for death of another
existed; cause of action exists only by statute); Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573,
575, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977) (action for wrongful death is pure creature of
statute); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 395, 146 S.E.2d 425, 426 (1966)
(common law gives no right of action for tortious killing of another); Incollingo
v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 302-03, 282 A.2d 206, 226 (1971) (at common law, no
recovery for wrongful death was allowed; condition was remedied by
legislature).
The Arizona Supreme Court, in reversing its previous denial of a wrongful
death recovery for the death of a viable fetus, criticized reliance upon the Bolton
684 [Vol. 31 :p. 669
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of action were accepted, it would obviate the need to discern the legisla-
tive intent underlying wrongful death legislation. In Gaudette v. Webb, 75 a
case dealing with the wrongful death of an adult, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court adopted the Massachusetts wrongful death legislation as
the state's common law. 76 As authority for its position, the court relied
on Moragne v. States Marine Lines, which held that established legislative
policy can become part of the common law.
77
Like the court in Gaudette, the Summerfield court also questioned
whether the common law barred recovery for wrongful death. 78 The
court recognized the weak basis for the common law rule, and cited
Moragne and Gaudette as providing a basis for wrongful death recovery at
common law. 79 However, the court refused to rely on a common law
analysis and instead interpreted the state wrongful death statute as pro-
viding recovery. 80
c. Policy Factors Militating In Favor of Allowing Wrongful Death
Actions for the Wrongful Death of the Unborn
A third major consideration that several courts have focused upon
is whether recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus should be allowed
as a matter of policy.8 1 The majority position contains two policy argu-
rule for several reasons. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 471, 698 P.2d at 716. First, the
court noted that the Bolton common law rule is premised upon the felony-merger
doctrine. Id. at 471, 698 P.2d at 712. The court reasoned that, since this doc-
trine never existed in the United States, the foundation for the Bolton rule col-
lapses. Id. Second, the court noted that Arizona had only adopted English
common law up until 1776. Id. Since the Bolton rule had not been established
until 1808, the court indicated that reliance on the common law to bar recovery
"may be misplaced." Id.
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that, by allowing a cause of
action for the death of a fetus, they were "changing" their common law to adapt
to modern life. Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 928 (Okla. 1976). The court
recognized that the right to recovery "accrues solely by virtue of statute." Id. at
927. However, the court expounded on the fact that a common law right to
recover did exist for prenatal injuries. Id. Based on this premise, the court
stated that a cause of action could be allowed in cases where the child is stillborn
due to its injuries. Id. at 928.
75. 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972) (reversing Carey v. Berkshire
R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1884) (adopting Bolton rule as the law of Massachusetts)).
76. Id. at 71, 284 N.E.2d at 228.
77. 398 U.S. 375, 390-92 (1969). The Supreme Court permitted a cause of
action under the common law where none was previously provided. Id. at 409.
The basis for the common law action was a federal wrongful death statute. Id. at
390-92.
78. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 471-72, 698 P.2d at 716.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 473, 698 P.2d at 718. The court stated, "[w]e conclude, at a mini-
mum, that statute and precedent have combined to produce a cause of action
with common law attributes." Id.
81. For a comparison of the competing policy rationales, see infra notes 82-
84 & 91-99 and accompanying text.
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ments. First, the majority notes that the general purposes of the wrong-
ful death statute, in all but two states, are to compensate the survivors of
the decedent and to deter the type of conduct that causes the death of
another;82 these goals are met only if recovery is allowed. 83 In addition,
several courts have argued that it is both illogical and inequitable to al-
low a tort action where a fetus is injured but to deny relief where the
more egregious result of death occurs, because to do so is to reward a
tortfeasor for killing his victim.
84
2. The Minority Position
Not surprisingly, the rationales asserted by those minority of courts
that deny a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus are respon-
sive to the arguments advanced by the majority of courts that permit
recovery. Most courts holding the minority view argue that to find a
legislative intent to include fetuses under a wrongful death act is to im-
properly create a cause of action not provided for by statute or in the
common law.8 5
In the vanguard of the minority is Justus v. Atchison.86 The Justus
court explicitly rejected the notions advanced in Moragne.8 7 The court
82. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 946. For a discussion of
legislative policy behind the wrongful death legislation, see supra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 479, 698 P.2d at 721 (allowing cause of
action for wrongful death of fetus fulfills policy of law to protect and compen-
sate); Volk, 103 Idaho at 574, 651 P.2d at 14-15 (legislative purpose is deter-
rence; allowing recovery for stillbirth furthers this purpose); Weitl v. Moes, 311
N.W.2d 259, 276 (Iowa 1981) (Larson, J., dissenting) (to construe term "per-
son" to include fetus provides remedy for inflicted injury); O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d
at 908 (both purposes of wrongful death statute are met if cause of action for
wrongful death of fetus is permitted); McBane, 359 N.W.2d at 865 (N.D. 1984)
(statute must be liberally construed to facilitate remedial purpose); cf Eich v.
Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974) (wrongful
death statute is punitive, allowing recovery for causing stillbirth furthers puni-
tive goal).
84. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721 (sensible to allow
cause of action where fetus dies from its injuries, since action is allowed if fetus
is born alive); Amadio, 509 Pa. at 205, 501 A.2d at 1088 (court no longer sanc-
tions "a legal doctrine that enables a tortfeasor who causes death to escapefull
liability, while rendering one whose wrongdoing is less severe in its conse-
quences answerable in a wrongful death or other negligence action merely be-
cause his victim survives birth") (emphasis in original); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24
N.Y.2d 478, 492, 248 N.E.2d 901, 908, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 76 (1969) (Burke, J.,
dissenting) ("absurd" to allow recovery if fetus is injured but born alive, but not
if fetus is so badly injured that it dies en utero); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117
R.I. 177, 187, 365 A.2d 748, 753 (1976) ("it makes poor sense to [allow] the
tortfeasor whose deed brings about a stillbirth to escape liability but [hold lia-
ble] one whose wrongdoing is less severe ... merely because his victim survives
birth"). See also McBane, 359 N.W.2d at 864-65 (same, quoting Presley).
85. For mention of a court adopting this view, see supra note 31.
86. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (en banc).
87. Id. at 573, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (rejecting Moragne v.
686 (Vol. 31 :p. 669
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held that the passage of the wrongful death act evinced an intent on the
part of the legislature to "occupy the field" of wrongful death recov-
ery. 88 Therefore, the court held, in direct contrast to Moragne, that the
court was precluded from expanding the allowable cause of action any
further than that provided for by statute. 89 The court went on to con-
clude that the use of the term person evinced a clear intent to preclude
any cause of action for the death of a fetus.9 0
In response to those courts that rely on policy considerations in
support of recovery, 9 1 some courts have relied almost entirely on policy
arguments to deny a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus. 92
For example, in Graf v. Taggert,93 the New Jersey Supreme Court pre-
mised its denial of a cause of action on the ground that damages are too
speculative in a case where the decedent is never born alive. 94 Likewise,
in Endresz v. Friedberg,9 5 the New York Court of Appeals dismissed a fa-
ther's suit for the wrongful death of his unborn twins because it believed
any damage award would be too speculative. 9 6 Moreover, the Endresz
States Marine Line, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284
N.E.2d 222 (1972)). The California court found that the legislature believed no
right of action existed for wrongful death. 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128-29,
139 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04. In light of this finding, the court reasoned that the
legislature intended to create a new cause of action based only on the statute.
Id.
88. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
TheJustus court admitted that in some instances, it could liberally construe legis-
lation. Id. In this case, however, the court found that the wrongful death statute
was so broad, the legislature intended to preclude any judicial intervention in
the field. Id. In other words, since the legislature attempted to provide for so
many contingencies, there were no statutory "gaps" to fill. Id.
For a discussion of the evolution of California's wrongful death statute and
an analysis attempting to justify theJustus court's interpretation, see Comment,
Justifying the Denial of Wrongful Death Actions to Cohabitants, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
417 (1982-1983).
89. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
90. Id. at 579, 565 P.2d at 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107. For a more extensive
discussion of the legislative intent behind the wrongful death statutes, see supra
notes 30-73 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion of the policy arguments of the majority position, see
supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Grafv. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
93. 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964). In Graf, the plaintiff sued the driver
of a car that had collided with hers. Id. at 304-05, 204 A.2d 141. The plaintiff's
seven-month fetus was stillborn as a result of the accident. Id.
94. Id. at 311, 204 A.2d at 145. The New Jersey court stated that, in the
case of a prenatal death, "there can be no evidence from which to infer pecuni-
ary loss to the surviving beneficiaries." Id. The court found that, at the most,
the beneficiaries could prove their own ages and socio-economic status in an
attempt to show the extent of their loss. Id.
95. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
96. Id. at 484, 248 N.E.2d at 903-04, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
In Endresz, viable fetal twins suffered injuries in an auto accident and were
stillborn. Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 481, 248 N.E.2d at 902, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
19861 687NOTE
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court also found that proof of causation would be too speculative in the
case of prenatal deaths.9 7 The majority position contends that concerns
over proof of causation and damages should not prohibit bringing a
cause of action. 98
Another dimension of the Endresz holding illustrates yet another
point around which the minority and majority positions diverge. Several
courts in the majority reason that to allow a tort action where a fetus is
injured, yet deny relief where the more egregious result of death occurs,
is to reward the tortfeasor for killing his victim. 9 9 However, the Endresz
court espoused a view to the contrary by reasoning that compensation is
necessary when a child is born burdened with the "scars" of another's
wrongdoing, but not when a child is stillborn.il °
Finally, in contrast to the position adopted by Pennsylvania, Iowa,
and Missouri, is the position taken by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Company. 101 Like Pennsylvania, the Virginia
However, the court stated that proof of loss due to the death of an unborn child
was too "vague" to permit recovery. Id. at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 69. Thus, the court reasoned that "the Legislature did not intend to authorize
the maintenance of a wrongful death action where there are 'no elements
whatever upon which a jury could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury
has been suffered by the plaintiff from the loss of the unborn child.' " Id. (quot-
ing Butler v. Manhattan Ry. Co. 143 N.Y. 417, 421-22, 38 N.E. 454, 455 (1894)).
See also Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). The
Thompson court relied extensively on the Graf decision, terming it "scholarly and
excellent." Id. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429. The Thompson court ruled that "it can
hardly be seriously contended that the death of afoetus represents any real pecu-
niary loss to the parents." Id. at 399, 146 S.E.2d at 429 (emphasis in original).
97. Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 484, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69 (spec-
ulation regarding causation impermissibly increased in case of stillborn fetus).
98. See, e.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 359-60, 331
N.E.2d 916, 919 (1975) (nature of damages cannot justify denial of right of ac-
tion; damages in death of fetus no more speculative than in normal tort action);
Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 492, 248 N.E.2d at 909, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 76 (Burke, J.,
dissenting) (difficulty in proving causation and damages is no bar to recovery for
prenatal injuries nor is difficulty of proof any different in other tort actions);
Amadio, 509 Pa. at 205, 501 A.2d at 1088 (difficulties of proof should never bar
one's right to bring cause of action); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177,
189, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976) (difficulties in proving causation should not block
attempts to prove causal relation).
99. For a discussion of the cases advancing this policy argument, see supra
note 84 and accompanying text.
100. Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
Several judges have argued that sufficient compensation is available in that the
parents can bring their own actions. See, e.g., Graf, 43 N.J. at 312-13, 204 A.2d at
146 (mother can bring own action for both mental and physical injuries); Endresz,
24 N.Y.2d at 484-85, 487-88, 248 N.E.2d at 904, 906, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69-70, 72(mother has cause of action for her injuries, father may sue for funeral expenses
and loss of consortium, but recovery for wrongful death would be "windfall");
Amadio, 509 Pa. at 237, 501 A.2d at 1104 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (parents can
recover for emotional distress in separate action, allowing wrongful death suit is
double recovery).
101. 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
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courts consider their wrongful death statute to be derivative.10 2 With
this presumption, the Lawrence court argued consistently with the Weitl
court, stating that since an unborn child has no right to maintain an
action, no action vests in the parents upon the fetus's death.' 0 3 The
Lawrence court maintained that if an unborn child had the standing to
sue before it was born, it would necessarily follow that his or her benefi-
ciaries should be able to bring a survival action for injuries the fetus
suffered in utero, even in a case where the fetus is subsequently stillborn
for an unrelated reason.'
0 4
III. ANALYSIS
A. Does the Interaction of the Common Law Rule and Legislative Intent Act
As a Bar to Recovery?
When a court holds that the legislative intent behind wrongful
death legislation precludes a statutory cause of action for recovery, the
effect is to completely bar any wrongful death recovery for the death of a
fetus because the common law in almost every jurisdiction provides for
no cause of action.' 0 5 The courts denying recovery under a wrongful
102. See id. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441; Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 176, 104
S.E.2d 795, 797-98 (1958) (wrongful death statute creates no new cause of ac-
tion but continues right of decedent to bring action). But see Wilson v. Whitaker,
207 Va. 1032, 1036, 154 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1967) (wrongful death statute creates
new cause of action; no right of action survives decedent); Anderson v. Hygeia
Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 691, 24 S.E. 269, 271 (1896) (in passing wrongful death
act, legislature "plainly did not intend to continue or cause to survive [dece-
dent's] right of action for the injury, but to substitute for it ... a new and origi-
nal right of action"). Interestingly, both Wilson and Sherley cite the Anderson court
in support of their respective holdings. See Wilson v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 1032,
1036, 154 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1967); Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 176, 104 S.E.2d
795, 797-98 (1958).
103. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442. The court stated that a
child en ventre sa mere cannot maintain an action for personal injury. Id. at 140,
169 S.E.2d at 441. Therefore, since the fetus had no right to sue at the time of
death, no right to sue passes on to the survivors. Id. The court even went so far
as to cite the Dietrich rationale that a fetus is part of the mother until birth. Id. at
142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
104. Id. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441.
A dissenting justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court made a similar ar-
gument in Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 201-02, 365 A.2d 748, 758
(1976) (Kelleher, J., dissenting). Presley stemmed from a malpractice action. Id.
at 178-79, 365 A.2d at 749. A physician had prescribed drugs to induce labor;
this allegedly negligent treatment resulted in the child's stillbirth. Id. In his
dissent, Justice Kelleher argued that the term "person" must be given its ordi-
nary meaning. Id. at 196, 365 A.2d at 757 (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g.,Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 573-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 103-04 (holding that legislature intended to "occupy the field," thus preclud-
ing judicial intervention); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) (subse-
quent legislation was implicit approval of priorjudicial interpretation of statute).
For a discussion of the various modes of interpretation of legislative intent, see
supra notes 30-73 & 85-90 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the com-
mon law of wrongful death, see supra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
1986] NOTE 689
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death statute reason that to allow a cause of action in the case of a fetus
is to expand the recovery beyond what the legislature explicitly contem-
plated. 10 6 In addition, while courts do expand the common law, the
minority position is that any expansion of wrongful death recovery is
improper since a wrongful death action is strictly a creation of
statute. 107
It is submitted that the reasoning of a minority of courts, to deny
recovery by drawing on the lack of a common law basis for recovery and
a restrictive interpretation of legislative intent, impairs legal analysis and
defies logical reasoning. These courts rely on what amounts to a "con-
structive legislative intent," in that the minority gleans a legislative in-
tent to deny a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus from the
legislature's use of the term "person."' 1 8 It is suggested that such a
finding goes beyond an analysis of actual legislative intent because, as
several courts have noted, the state legislatures had not actually consid-
ered whether the term person should include an unborn child. 10 9
By so reasoning, the minority of courts are effectively reinstating
the common law rule, a rule, it is suggested, with no logical or just ba-
sis. 1 10 Indeed, the decision in Baker v. Bolton, 1 1' which first established
106. For a discussion of the minority position, see supra notes 85-103 and
accompanying text.
107. See, e.g.,Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 579-80, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
107 (strict construction necessary when legislative intent is clear); Stern v.
Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 308 (Fla. 1977) (strict construction necessary to accom-
plish legislative objectives); Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 217 (court's interpretive role
limited to what legislature explicitly provides for in statute); Egbert v. Wenzl,
199 Neb. 573, 574, 260 N.W.2d 480, 481 (1977) (had legislature intended recov-
ery for death of fetus, it would have specifically provided for it); Hogan v. Mc-
Daniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 241, 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (1958) (abrogated by statute)
(cannot expand recovery beyond what is unambiguously provided for in statute);
Lawrence, 210 Va. at 213, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (court will not "presume" legislature
intended any meaning of term "person" that is broader than common meaning).
108. The exact reasons for yielding to the legislature vary. Compare Law-
rence, 210 Va. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (court refused to "presume" that legisla-
ture intended "person" to include fetus) withJustus, 19 Cal. 3d at 575, 565 P.2d
at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (legislature intended to "occupy the field") and
Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 308 (Fla. 1977) (past judicial interpretations
exclude fetuses from class of "persons" and legislature is presumed to know this
construction).
109. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 471, 698 P.2d at 717-18 ("it is most
likely the legislature never adverted to the fetus/person issue");Justus, 19 Cal.
3d at 579, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (court was "not so naive as to
believe that the Legislature entertained any intent at all with respect to fe-
tuses"); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 494, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (1971)
(legislature "very probably gave no thought to whether they were creating an
action for pre-natal injury or pre-natal death"); Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 275 (Lar-
son, J., dissenting in part) ("legislature could not be presumed to have had an
intent" as to recovery for fetal death); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass.
354, 360 n.8, 331 N.E.2d 916, 919 n.8 (1975) (legislative history no help in de-
fining term "person" within context of wrongful death statute).
110. For a discussion of the basis for the common law rule, see supra note
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the common law rule, has been criticized as nothing more than an un-
substantiated statement of law with no authority whatsoever for sup-
port. 12 While it is true that the Bolton decision logically follows from
the felony-merger doctrine, that doctrine cannot justify adherence to the
common law rule in this country because it never existed in America.' 13
Furthermore, as Moragne and Gaudette indicate, the lack of recovery
under English common law need not prohibit recovery presently be-
cause the right to recover for wrongful death has become so established
today, as evidenced by the proliferation of wrongful death legislation,
that the right to recover can be incorporated as part of the common
law.' 14
In contrast to the courts permitting recovery, the California
Supreme Court inJustus is the only court following the minority rule that
considered the possibility of adopting the right to recover as part of the
common law.'' 5 TheJustus court refused to adopt a common law right
to recovery, instead ruling that the wrongful death statute revealed a
legislative intent to preclude judicial intervention to allow recovery for
the death of a fetus. 16 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Tobri-
10. See also Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 471, 698 P.2d at 716 (discussing questiona-
ble bases for common law rule).
111. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). For a discussion of Bolton, see supra note
9.
112. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). As Prosser has
phrased it, "in 1808, Lord Ellenbourgh, whose forte was never common sense,
held without citing any authority that a husband had no action [for his wife's
death]." W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 901 (4th ed. 1971).
113. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 471, 698 P.2d at 716.
114. For a discussion of the possibility of adopting statutory provisions as
part of the common law, see supra notes 11 & 35-40 and accompanying text.
An additional, but somewhat weaker, argument considered by the Arizona
Supreme Court in Summerfield was that the common law rule from Bolton has
never been the common law in the United States. See Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at
471, 698 P.2d at 716. Since Bolton was decided in 1808, and Arizona, like most
states, had adopted the English common law only up to 1776, the Summerfield
court questioned whether American common law had incorporated the Bolton
decision. Id. If, however, any basis for the common law rule existed prior to
1776, this argument fails; thus, even the Summerfield court did not place great
reliance on the argument. Id. at 472, 698 P.2d at 717-18. Additionally, most
states had explicitly adopted the Bolton rule by judicial decision, and therefore,
there would not be any common law basis for recovery in these jurisdictions.
For a discussion of the American courts adopting the Bolton decision, see supra
note 9. However, if the Bolton rule were adopted as the common law by judicial
decision, these courts should be able to reject the Bolton rule by judicial decision
as well. See Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 60, 284 N.E.2d at 222 (overruling Carey v.
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848), which had adopted the Bolton holding); see
also Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Okla. 1976) (court "updating" its
common law to reflect present knowledge and modern society).
115. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 573, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (find-
ing legislature intended to "occupy the field" of wrongful death, making it im-
permissible to follow the Moragne approach).
116. Id.
1986] NOTE
23
Starczewski: Wrongful Death of a Fetus: Does a Cause of Action Arise When Ther
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
692 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 :p. 669
ner argued that the legislature did not intend to preclude the court from
recognizing a common law cause of action for wrongful death.' 7 He
argued that since the legislature did not explicitly preclude "Uludicial
expansion and refinement" of wrongful death concepts, the court was
free to follow the lead established by the Supreme Court in Moragne.1 18
Indeed, Justice Tobriner's view would appear to totally undercut the ba-
sis of the majority opinion inJustus, thus permitting judicial evolution of
a common law right to recovery.
B. The Lord Campbell Type Statute Cannot Be Read as a Bar to a Cause of
Action for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus: A Suggested
Interpretation of the "Had Death Not Ensued"
Language
Regardless of whether a court is unwilling to recognize a common
law cause of action for wrongful death of a fetus, a court must still allow
the action if the wrongful death statute permits it. Therefore, courts are
forced to interpret the statute and, in so doing, a few have found that the
use of the term "person" reveals a legislative intent to permit suit in the
case of a fetus. 1 9 In comparison, several courts in the minority have
concluded that the legislature had intended to preclude a cause of action
for the death of a fetus by using terms such as person or child.' 20
Again, it is suggested that such an argument is tenuous at best. It is
quite unlikely, as many courts have openly conceded, that the legisla-
tures, when passing their wrongful death statutes, ever considered
whether the term person encompassed a fetus.' 2 '
117. Id. at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Tobriner,J., concur-
ring) (arguing that there is no basis for concluding the legislature intended to
preclude courts from allowing recovery in instant case but that policy concerns
do support the majority's decision).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 715-16, 87 S.E.2d 100,
102 (1955) (statute required death of child, and definition of child deemed to
include fetus from point of quickening); Volk, 103 Idaho at 573, 651 P.2d at 14-
15 (statute required death of "minor child," court held term minor child implied
upper age limit only and therefore viable fetus easily fits within definition of
term "minor child"); Hopkins, 359 N.W.2d at 865 ("it is commonly understood
that an unborn child is a . . . person").
120. See, e.g.,Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
105-07 (had legislature intended to include fetus within definition of person, it
would have specifically done so); Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 307 (Fla. 1977)
(legislature did not intend to include fetus within definition of term person);
Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 575-76, 260 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1977) (common
law did not recognize fetus as being person; thus, if legislature intended mean-
ing other than at common law, it would specifically state it); Hogan v. McDaniel,
204 Tenn. 235, 242-45, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224-25 (1958) ("[iut is inconceivable
that the legislature contemplated the creation of [a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus]."); Lawrence, 210 Va. at 140-41, 169 S.E.2d at 441-42
(common understanding of term "person" does not include fetus).
121. For a discussion of the legislature's intentions in using the term per-
son or similar phrases, see supra notes 30-73 and accompanying text.
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If, as is suggested here, no legislative intent based on the use of the
term person can be found, 12 2 then it is submitted that in determining
whether a cause of action exists under a Lord Campbell type statute, the
proper focus becomes whether the injured "person" would have had the
ability to maintain an action had death not occurred.' 2 3 Assuming that
the state legislatures did not consider whether a fetus is a person,' 2 4 it is
suggested that so long as a fetus is of the class who could sue for the
wrongful act if death had not occurred, then there is no violation of leg-
islative intent by allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
fetus.
In Weitl, the Iowa Supreme Court denied recovery for the wrongful
An additional argument made by some courts that hold the legislature in-
tends to preclude recovery in cases of prenatal wrongful death hinges upon leg-
islative inaction. SeeJustus, 19 Cal. 3d at 578-79, 565 P.2d at 131-32, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 106-07; Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1977). TheJustus
court noted that on two previous occasions the court had held that unborn chil-
dren were not included within statutory terms. In Keeler v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court held that the homicide statute did not apply to the
killing of a fetus. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 481 (1970). In People v. Yates, the court held that a fetus was not a minor
child for purposes of a child support statute. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App.
Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931). TheJustus court noted that in these two prior
instances, the legislature amended the applicable statutes so as to abrogate the
courts' holdings. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 578-79, 565 P.2d at 131-32, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 106-07. By comparison, theJustus court suggested that, since the legislature
had not responded to court decisions denying a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a fetus, the legislature had revealed its "clear" intent to exclude fetuses
from the statute's coverage. Id. at 580, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
Similarly, the Stern court argued that since the legislature had not amended the
wrongful death statute to negate the court's past holdings, the legislature must
have acceded to the court's interpretation. Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 306-
07 (Fla. 1977).
It is submitted that legislative inaction is not necessarily an accurate indica-
tion of legislative intent. Legislative inaction should never be used in determin-
ing legislative intent until after a court has ruled on a disputed interpretation.
Additionally, inquiries into legislative inaction do not always yield a definitive
conclusion regarding the legislature's intent. See Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 475-
76, 698 P.2d at 723-24. For example, in Summerfield, the defendants argued that
the legislature did not intend to allow recovery for a prenatal death, as evi-
denced by the defeat of a bill that would have allowed recovery. Id. However,
the Summerfield court refused to impute an intent based on the rejection of the
bill because the bill was primarily concerned with regulations in the highly con-
troversial area of abortion. Id.
122. For a breakdown of the terms used in the various state statutes, see
Note, supra note 11, at 282-85. It is submitted that regardless of whether a stat-
ute refers to a person, or a child or some other being, the proper analysis would
not change.
123. This had-death-not-occurred language is, of course, the second ele-
ment of the Lord Campbell type statute. For a discussion of the Lord Campbell
Act, see supra note 8.
124. For a discussion of why it is inappropriate to focus upon legislative
intent in using terms such as "person," see supra notes 105-118 and accompany-
ing text.
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death of a fetus. 12 5 However, two years later, in Dunn, the same court
allowed a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus pursuant to
Rule 8 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. 126 It is submitted that the
true difference between these two decisions involves only the different
nature of the recovery allowed by each statute. Iowa's wrongful death
statute, being derivative in nature, merely preserves any rights the dece-
dent had at the time of death. 12 7 Under a proper analysis of a derivative
wrongful death statute, recovery can be denied by requiring a person to
be born alive before any right to sue accrues. 12 8 In comparison, Rule 8
of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure is a Lord Campbell type wrongful
death statute, pursuant to which the parents recover for their own dam-
ages, not for those suffered by the decedent. 12 9 In a proper analysis of a
Lord Campbell type statute, the right of the fetus to sue at the time of
death is irrelevant. 130
It is suggested that the proper analysis of the had-death-not-ensued
language of the Lord Campbell type statute requires the same analysis
as the Dunn court gave Rule 8. Thus, if a wrongful death statute is of the
survival type, that is, providing a recovery derivative in nature, a court
might deny recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus by requiring that
the fetus be born alive before any right of action accrues. However,
under the Lord Campbell type statute, which gives the survivors their
own cause of action for their own injury, the fetus need not have sur-
vived birth. All that would be required is that had the fetus survived
birth, he or she could have brought an action for damages. Indeed, this
view was taken by the Missouri Supreme Court in O'Grady,13 1 and
adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Summerfield 13 2 and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Amadio.' 3 3
125. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270-71. For a discussion of the Weitl decision,
see supra notes 51-53.
126. Dunn, 333 N.W.2d at 831-33. For a discussion of the Dunn case, see
supra note 54-57 and accompanying text.
127. Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270. For a comparison of wrongful death stat-
utes with statutes of the derivative type, i.e., survival statutes, see supra note 8.
128. See Lawrence, 210 Va. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (to allow action of de-
ceased fetus to pass to survivors requires that child en ventre sa mere be able to
maintain action for injuries). For a further discussion of Lawrence, see infra notes
142-47 and accompanying text.
129. Dunn, 333 N.W.2d at 831-33 (Iowa wrongful death action is suit on
behalf of decedent, rule 8 is action on behalf of survivors).
130. Id. The court noted that "[w]hat is involved here is a right of recovery
given to a parent. The parent's loss does not depend on the legal status of the
child; indeed, the absence of the child is the crux of the suit." Id. at 833.
131. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983). For a discussion of the O'Grady court's
interpretation of the second prong of the Lord Campbell type statute, see supra
notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
132. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985). For a discussion of the Summerfield
court's interpretation of the had-death-not-ensued language, see supra notes 71-
73 and accompanying text.
133. 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
694 [Vol. 31 :p. 669
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/6
The O'Grady court held that the had-death-not-ensued language im-
posed a but-for requirement upon recovery for wrongful death.' 3 4
Thus, if the defendant's conduct would have entitled the decedent to
sue but-for the fact that such conduct caused the decedent's death, the
survivors have their own cause of action for wrongful death. 135 The
Summerfield court elaborated on the O'Grady interpretation by holding
that the second prong of a Lord Campbell type wrongful death statute
refers "to the circumstances under which the injury arose and the nature
of the wrongful act .... 136 Therefore, under this analysis, what mat-
ters is whether the defendant's conduct is legally actionable. If the child
is born alive and would then be entitled to sue, the parents have their
own legal action notwithstanding the fact that the child was not born
alive. Under this analysis, a cause of action would accrue to the survi-
vors for the wrongful death of a fetus because state courts unanimously
hold that a surviving child can sue for injuries he or she suffered
prenatally. 13 7 In the most recent pronouncement on the wrongful death
of a fetus, Amadio, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed to take this
same approach by focusing on whether the defendant's conduct is ac-
tionable in general.
In Amadio, the court held that since a fetus is an individual capable
of recovering for prenatal injury, logic dictates that a fetus is also an
individual under the wrongful death statute.'13 In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Zappala highlighted the parallel between the Amadio and
O'Grady analyses by stating that the right to proceed with an action for
wrongful death stems from "the tort which produces death and not the
death caused by the tort."' 13 9 According to Justice Zappala's view, the
"cause of action arises out of the unlawful violence or negligence."' 140
As under the O'Grady and Summerfield decisions, the Amadio court prop-
erly focused upon whether the nature of the act gives rise to a cause of
134. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910.
135. Id.
136. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 475, 698 P.2d at 720 (quoting Barragan v.
Superior Court, 12 Ariz. App. 402, 405,470 P.2d 722, 725 (1970)). The Summer-
field court explicitly adopted the O'Grady analysis. See id.
137. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 368. For a discussion of
some of the older cases first recognizing a right of a child to recover for injuries
inflicted prenatally, see Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1222 (1971).
138. See Amadio, 509 Pa. at 204-05, 501 A.2d at 1087. For a further discus-
sion of the Pennsylvania court's analysis, see supra notes 65-70 and accompany-
ing text.
139. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 229, 501 A.2d at 1100 (Zappala, J., concurring)
(quoting Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 244 Pa. 255, 262, 90 A. 558, 561
(1914)).
140. Amadio, 509 Pa. at 229, 501 A.2d at 1100 (Zappala, J., concurring)
(quoting Birch v. Pittsburgh C.C. & S.L. Ry., 165 Pa. 339, 346, 30 A. 826, 827
(1895)). It is submitted that Justice Zappala's argument focuses on whether the
defendants' conduct is of a type that would have entitled the decedent to sue if
he had survived.
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action, not upon whether the decedent is capable of suing when death
occurs. 141
It is submitted that this second prong of the Lord Campbell type
statute should control in interpreting whether a wrongful death action is
permissible under the statute. No clear indication of legislative intent
can be found in the use of a term such as "person." Indeed, the second
prong of the statute can be viewed as a modifier of the first prong: if a
party is one who would have been legally entitled to sue for the wrong-
ful act inflicted upon him, then that party's survivors are entitled to
bring a wrongful death action. The fact that in the case of a prenatal
death the court might not recognize the child's cause of action as having
accrued, since the child was never born alive, is irrelevant. The unborn
child's potential cause of action can die with the child because the par-
ents are bringing their own action, not the child's action.
To the contrary to this position, the Lawrence court has relied on this
141. The Pennsylvania court views its wrongful death statute as being a de-
rivative action: "[t]he death action technically is a new cause of action, however
it too is basically derivative." Carrol v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 48, 202 A.2d 9, 10
(1964) (overruled by Amadio). This position presents a potential point of confu-
sion with the Amadio approach in that, it is arguable that in order to properly
allow the parents to recover for the death of a fetus under a derivative statute,
the fetus must have had the right to sue before it died. See Lawrence, 210 Va. at
142, 169 S.E.2d at 442. For an analysis of the Lawrence court rationale, see infra,
notes 142-47 and accompanying text. This same criticism is applicable in regard
to the Amadio court's decision to allow suit for the death of a fetus based on its
survival statute, since a survival statute is also derivative and requires that the
child be born alive. See Amadio, - Pa. at -, 501 A.2d at 1087, 1089. It is sub-
mitted that a wrongful death recovery under Pennsylvania law is not derivative.
The fact that it is a new cause of action by the decedent's survivors for their own
injuries, as opposed to the decedent's own cause of action, means it is not truly a
derivative action. See W. PROSSER, supra note 112, at 901; see also Harvey v. Hass-
inger, 315 Pa. Super. 97, 102-03, 461 A.2d 814, 816 (1983) (citing Pezzulli v.
D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 647, 26 A.2d 659, 661 (1942)) (wrongful death is new
cause of action whereas survival action only preserves decedent's right of action
in his or her representatives). The death action could not be derivative because
the decedent could never have had the right to sue for the damages available
under the wrongful death statute. Such right exists solely in the survivors and is
only "derivative" in the sense that the right exists only because of the death of
the decedent. See W. PROSSER, supra, at 902.
Moreover, the difference in the nature of the recovery allowed under Penn-
sylvania's wrongful death and survival statutes demonstrates that Pennsylvania's
wrongful death recovery is not derivative. The damages allowable in Penn-
sylvania under a survival action include loss of past and future earnings that the
decedent would have accrued, decedent's pain and suffering, and medical ex-
penses. McClinton v. White, 285 Pa. Super. 271, 277, 427 A.2d 218, 221 (1981).
In contrast, damages for wrongful death include the loss suffered by the benefi-
ciaries under the statute: earnings by decedent that would have benefited the
beneficiaries, services and gifts that the decedent would have provided the bene-
ficiaries, medical expenses, and funeral expenses. Id. The categories of dam-
ages are basically distinct except for some overlap in regard to medical expenses
and possible future earnings. For a general discussion of the distinction be-
tween a derivative action and a nonderivative action, see supra note 8.
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second element of a wrongful death statute to deny recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus.142 In Lawrence, the court viewed the recovery
allowable under its Lord Campbell type wrongful death statute as deriv-
ative in nature, ' 43 although the Virginia courts have not actually labeled
the cause of action as derivative. 144 Specifically, the Lawrence court im-
plicitly viewed the Virginia wrongful death statute as derivative by hold-
ing that unless the decedent had the right to sue at the time of death, no
right to sue could pass to the decedent's survivors. 14 5 Since the court
refused to recognize any right in an unborn child to sue, naturally no
right to recovery passes to the unborn child's parents. 14 6 It is suggested
that the Lawrence court's analysis is actually an analysis of a survival ac-
tion and is simply incorrect under a wrongful death statute. The court's
analysis ignores the conditional phrase in a Lord Campbell type wrong-
ful death statute: a cause of action for wrongful death exists when the
decedent himself would have been able to sue if he had survived. Obvi-
ously, the right of the decedent himself to sue is conditional upon the
decedent surviving the tort, but nothing in the wrongful death statute
reasonably can be construed to require that the decedent's right to go to
court must have existed before death. In effect, the Lawrence court's
analysis mistakenly equates the ability to sue under a survival statute
with the ability to sue under a Lord Campbell type wrongful death
provision. 147
142. Lawrence, 210 Va. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (if decedent has no right to
sue at time of death, no wrongful death action passes to decedent's representa-
tives). For a discussion of the Lawrence court's opinion, see supra notes 100-04
and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. In fact, prior decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court have held that
its wrongful death statute is not derivative. See, e.g., Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va.
1032, 1036, 154 S.E.2d 124, 129 (1967) (holding wrongful death act does not
cause action to "survive," but creates "new right of action"); Anderson v. Hy-
geia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 691-92, 24 S.E. 269, 271 (1896) (holding wrongful
death act not derivative-actually new cause of action and not survival of dece-
dent's own action). It is submitted that the Lawrence court's holding contradicts
the clear precedent of both Wilson and Anderson. For a discussion of the confus-
ing interpretation by the Lawrence court of its wrongful death statute, see supra
note 103.
145. See Lawrence, 210 Va. at 140-41, 169 S.E.2d at 441.
146. Id.
147. The Lawrence court attempted to support its conclusion by proposing
an interesting hypothetical: suppose an unborn child is injured but ultimately
dies before birth for unrelated reasons. See id. The Lawrence court opined that
allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus would also require
allowing a survival action for the injuries suffered by the fetus. Id. However,
such is not the case. Even assuming that damages could be proven in the court's
hypothetical, recovery can indeed be denied using the court's own reasoning.
Since the hypothetical involves a survival action, the court would require that the
right to sue exist in the decedent before birth. However, since the Lawrence
court refused to recognize that an unborn child can bring an action, no cause of
action survives the death of the fetus to be passed on to its representatives.
Thus, under the court's hypothetical, a survival action would not lie. See also
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C. Policy Considerations-The Balance is in Favor of Allowing Recovery
The preceding sections have discussed the problem in discerning a
legislative intent behind wrongful death legislation and have proposed a
construction of the Lord Campbell type statute that would allow a cause
of action for the wrongful death of a fetus, without an unnecessarily
strained construction of the wrongful death legislation. The question
still remains whether a recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus should
be allowed at all. It is submitted that the policies underlying a typical
wrongful death statute militate strongly in favor of recovery.
Most courts are in agreement that the two primary purposes of a
wrongful death statute are to compensate the decedent's survivors and
to deter dangerous conduct. 148 In light of these legislative purposes, it
is entirely consistent to allow recovery for the wrongful death of a child,
regardless of whether that child survives birth. It is submitted that the
majority is simply proposing a fair and logical approach. One individual
should not be liable for conduct that causes injury while a second indi-
vidual is not liable for similar conduct which causes death. To hold
otherwise has been criticized as "rewarding" the tortfeasor for killing his
victim. 149 The equity in the majority approach is illustrated by consider-
ing the hypothetical of identical twins where both are simultaneously
injured by the same act, but one dies just prior to birth whereas the
second dies after birth. 150 There is neither a logical nor just reason for
allowing a cause of action for the death of the second twin, while deny-
ing an opportunity for compensation for the death of the first twin.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Endresz, attempted to justify the
minority position by asserting that compensation is just when a child
survives birth and must therefore face a life burdened with the result of
another's negligence. 1 5' However, according to the court, no compen-
sation would be required if the child is never born alive. 152 This argu-
Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 196, 365 A.2d 748, 756 (1976) (Kelle-
herJ., dissenting) (wherein Justice Kelleher posits hypothetical similar to that of
Lawrence court).
148. For a discussion of the policy concerns behind wrongful death legisla-
tion, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 476-77, 698 P.2d at 722 (illogical to
deny recovery if fetus dies immediately before birth but allow recovery if it dies
immediately after birth); Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 248 N.E.2d at 908, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 75-76 (Burke, J., dissenting in part) (denying recovery for stillbirth
leads to incongruous results); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 117, 188-89,
365 A.2d 748, 753 (1976) (illogical to deny recovery for death of any fetus);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 148 N.W.2d 107,
110 (1967) ("absurd" result to impose liability for injury but not death).
150. The Ohio Court of Appeals advanced this hypothetical in Stidham v.
Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 432, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
151. See Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 68-
69 (compensation only required where negligence of another causes one to be-
gin life impaired).
152. Id.
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ment is incorrect, however, in that under the wrongful death legislation,
the purpose is not to compensate the victim; the purpose is to compen-
sate the survivors for the losses they suffer. 15 3 Therefore, regardless of
whether the stillborn child really suffered any damages, the parents still
are entitled to compensation. 154
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that no valid reason exists today for refusing to allow
a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus. The legislatures have
remedied the unjust common law rule that precluded any recovery for
the death of another, but it is submitted that the current legislation
should be construed as protecting the unborn child as well. If it is not,
an outdated, inadequate, and unjust common law rule that should have
never even existed in the United States is effectively reinstated. There is
no barrier, it is suggested, to the state courts interpreting the term per-
son to include a fetus. Indeed, under the proposed construction of the
typical wrongful death statute, allowing recovery is entirely appropriate.
Justice and logic require that the interpretive gap in the laws of some
states, which allows a death to go uncompensated, be filled. As Justice
Cardozo once stated, "[d]eath statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction
with the archaisms of the law .... It would be a misfortune if a narrow
or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate
the very evils to be remedied."' 15 5
Michael Starczewski
153. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 949. The law in New
York clearly follows the principle that damages recoverable under a Lord Camp-
bell type statute are the pecuniary losses suffered by the statutory beneficiaries
and not any loss suffered by the decedent. Fornaro v.Jill Bros., Inc., 42 Misc. 2d
1031, 1032-34, 249 N.Y.S.2d 833, 836-38 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22
A.D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 819, 205 N.E.2d 862, 257
N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965).
154. For a related argument, see Amadio v. Levin wherein the three dissent-
ing judges, in three separate opinions, argued that the parents could recover for
their own mental distress in separate actions and that allowing a wrongful death
action would allow a double recovery. Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 230, 237,
501 A.2d 1085, 1101, 1104, 1105 (1985) (Nix, Flaherty, and Hutchinson, JJ.,
dissenting). However, a suit for wrongful death allows recovery for much more
than just mental distress. For a discussion of the damages recoverable under the
Pennsylvania wrongful death statute, see supra note 141. Thus, the dissenters'
position in Amadio, like that of the majority in Endresz, denies the parents the full
recovery that is proper under a Lord Campbell type wrongful death statute.
155. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937).
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